

48A C.J.S. Judges § 141

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Judges

Joseph Bassano, J.D.; Khara Singer-Mack, J.D.; Thomas Muskus, J.D.; Karl Oakes, J.D. and Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D.

V. Discipline, Suspension, or Removal

E. Sanctions

§ 141. Generally

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West's Key Number Digest

West's Key Number Digest, [Judges](#)  11(4)

The court in a judicial disciplinary proceeding has discretion as to the sanctions to be imposed. The court may remove, suspend, or retire a judge or impose a lesser sanction.

The court having jurisdiction over a judge has the ultimate responsibility to determine the degree of discipline or sanctions to be imposed in a disciplinary proceeding.¹ In determining appropriate discipline in cases of judicial misconduct, a state supreme court's primary concern is to provide sanction sufficient to restore and maintain dignity and honor of the judicial office and to protect public against further excess.²

Each case is to be judged in the light of its own particular circumstances,³ and it is within the sound discretion of the court to determine the measure and extent of the discipline to be imposed.⁴

While the court may impose the sanction of removal where appropriate,⁵ such extreme sanction should not be imposed absent truly egregious circumstances.⁶

Under appropriate circumstances, a judge may be suspended from the judiciary,⁷ without pay,⁸ or disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.⁹

The disciplinary power of a court to remove, suspend, or retire judges includes other disciplinary sanctions of a lesser nature.¹⁰ In addition to removal, suspension, or retirement, the court may impose limitations or conditions on the performance of judicial duties,¹¹ reprimand or censure,¹² fine,¹³ assessment of costs and expenses,¹⁴ or any combination of aforementioned sanctions.¹⁵

A public reprimand is the most severe sanction the court can impose when a judge no longer holds judicial office.¹⁶

Effect of suspension or removal.

Suspension and removal are two different judicial sanctions.¹⁷ Suspension does not prohibit a judge from seeking reelection, but removal does.¹⁸ Suspension lasts for a specific term of days, be it 30 days or the remaining days of a judge's term; removal is permanent because it entails not only removal from office but also prohibits the removed judge from again holding judicial office.¹⁹

A suspension from office without pay, regardless of duration, is not a minor sanction; even more than a public reprimand, any such suspension is a significant blemish on a sitting judge's reputation.²⁰

CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

Cases:

Public censure was appropriate sanction for judge, who had been arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) after she had previously pleaded guilty to DUI and had informed arresting police officers she was judge, in violation of professional conduct rules that required judges to act in manner that promoted public confidence in judiciary and that prohibited judges from abusing prestige of judicial office, and had agreed to retire. Colo. Code of Judicial Conduct, Rules 1.2, 1.3. [Matter of Gunkel, 2021 CO 30, 500 P.3d 381 \(Colo. 2021\)](#).

Removal from office was warranted for judge's dissemination of false information about opponent and opponent's family during campaign, his actions in holding first appearance hearings early on Saturday of holiday weekend without counsel present in order to suit his campaign schedule, his statements during campaign that he would never find statutes unconstitutional, and his order to search father in court to seize funds to pay father's child support obligation. [Fla. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canons 1, 2A, 3A, 3B2, 7A. Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 16-377 Re Dupont, 252 So. 3d 1130 \(Fla. 2018\).](#)

Six-month suspension from judicial duties, as well as public reprimand and requirement that judge pay costs of judicial disciplinary proceedings, was appropriate discipline for judge's violation of numerous professional conduct rules before his judicial campaign, including those governing dishonesty or misrepresentation, conflicts of interest, and candor to the tribunal, and Code of Judicial Conduct Canons during his judicial campaign, premised on his acknowledgement of affiliation with particular political party; judge's violations as then-attorney demonstrated critical lack of care concerning his clients, but there was nothing to suggest that misconduct caused significant harm to a client or another party. [Fla. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canons 7A\(3\)\(3\)\(ii\), 7A\(3\)\(b\); Fla. Bar Rules 4-1.7\(a\), 4-1.7\(c\), 4-1.8\(b\), 4-1.9\(b\), 4-3.3. Re Decker, 212 So. 3d 291 \(Fla. 2017\).](#)

Judge's use of social media to seek assistance of her friends to help her husband correct perceived misstatements of husband's judicial campaign opponent warranted a 30-day suspension without pay, where judge's conduct was improper, but it was followed quickly with remedial action, as judge removed message within hours of its posting, accepted full responsibility for her actions, and apologized. [In re Krause, 166 So. 3d 176 \(Fla. 2015\).](#)

Public reprimand was appropriate sanction for judge's conduct in having an inappropriate relationship with her bailiff, over whom she exercised supervisory authority, which went beyond the fraternization that normally occurred in a professional workplace, in violation of canons of Code of Judicial Conduct requiring judge to maintain high standards of conduct necessary to preserve integrity of the judiciary and to promote public confidence in judiciary; case of misconduct was isolated incident in judge's otherwise exemplary career, and judge had admitted her wrongdoing and that actions had effect of lessening public's confidence in judiciary, and vowed that such misconduct would not be repeated. [West's F.S.A. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canons 1, 2\(A\). In re Flood, 150 So. 3d 1097 \(Fla. 2014\).](#)

Permanent ban from serving in any judicial capacity of any kind, including but not limited to service as a judge pro tempore, temporary judge, or private judge, along with tendering of resignation to governor, was appropriate sanction for judge's conduct in abusing her contempt powers, imposing an unauthorized sentence, sua sponte ordering presentencing investigation after accepting guilty plea but rejecting plea agreement, holding sentencing hearing without

prosecutor present, failing to record sentencing hearing, and making injudicious comments on social networking page. Code of Jud.Conduct, [Canon 1](#), Rules 1.1, 1.2, Canon 2, Rules 2.2, 2.5(A), 2.6(A), 2.9(A), 2.16(A). [In re Bennington](#), 24 N.E.3d 958 (Ind. 2015).

For purposes of imposing discipline in judicial disciplinary cases, the Supreme Court views admonitions as considerably less severe than reprimands, and considers them to be something less than actual discipline. [In re Krull](#), 860 N.W.2d 38 (Iowa 2015).

Absence for the purpose of rehabilitation, like disability suspensions for attorneys, may be considered a mitigating factor in determining the length and adequacy of a disciplinary suspension for a judge. [In re Dean](#), 855 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 2014).

Public censure was appropriate discipline for attorney's violation of professional conduct rules governing knowingly making false or misleading statement and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation by publicly and falsely denying, while he was a judicial candidate, that he was not the person charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana nine years earlier. Kan. R. Prof. Conduct 8.2, 8.4; Kan. Code of Jud. Conduct, Rule 4.1(A)(4). [Matter of Giardine](#), 392 P.3d 89 (Kan. 2017).

Removal from judicial office was appropriate sanction to impose on judge who was found, in disciplinary proceedings before the Judicial Conduct Commission, to have committed misconduct by exerting influence in her son's criminal cases, removing or threatening to remove attorneys from her guardian ad litem (GAL) list for arbitrary reasons, abusing her position to gain special access to son while he was incarcerated, improperly directing her staff to administer drug testing, and lacking candor with Commission throughout its disciplinary investigation, in violation of Code of Judicial Conduct; judge committed numerous acts over extended period, and was previously warned about her actions related to son's cases. [Ky. Const. § 121](#); [Ky. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 4.020\(1\)\(b\)](#); [Ky. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 4.300](#), Code of Judicial Conduct, [Canons 1, 2](#). [Gordon v. Judicial Conduct Commission](#), 655 S.W.3d 167 (Ky. 2022).

Judge's conduct in holding prosecutor in contempt for conduct that was not contemptuous and in sua sponte dismissing 15 criminal cases without legal authority to do so warranted imposition of 30-day suspension without pay, rather than 90-day suspension, where conduct was an isolated incident, judge had only been on the bench for four months, judge acknowledge and took responsibility for her actions, judge no disciplinary history, and judge's actions resulted in no serious harm. [In re Sims](#), 159 So. 3d 1040 (La. 2015).

Probate judge, who faced sanctions in judicial discipline action for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, could not support his claim that a two-year suspension from practice and the \$5,000 forfeiture were more severe sanctions than sanctions that had been imposed on other

judges similarly situated, where records of referrals to the Supreme Judicial Court of claims of professional misconduct by attorneys or judges for over 30 years showed that no individual was subject to as many referrals for professional discipline as judge. [Matter of Nadeau, 2017 ME 191, 170 A.3d 255 \(Me. 2017\)](#).

Public censure and reprimand, and a 30-day suspension from the office of judge of probate, was warranted in judicial disciplinary proceeding where judge refused to acknowledge that he acted wrongfully when he sent a letter to opposing counsel in litigation in which judge was party that referred to his judicial position and stated that continued litigation would be "very bad" for counsel and his lawfirm, which added to the seriousness of the transgression, and judge had been subject to discipline on two prior occasions for violations of the professional ethical standards. Code of Jud.Conduct, [Canons 1, 2\(B\) \(1993\)](#). [In re Nadeau, 2016 ME 116, 144 A.3d 1161 \(Me. 2016\)](#).

Removal from office was appropriate sanction for conduct of District Court judge, who failed to reside in his judicial district and made knowingly false statement about his residency in his affidavit of candidacy, in violation of constitution and Code of Judicial Conduct; judge committed two very serious violations, each violation severely undermined public's trust in judicial system, and sanction of removal was only sanction adequate to ensure that people of Minnesota could have continued faith in integrity of justice system. [M.S.A. Const. Art. 6, § 4; 52 M.S.A., Code of Jud.Conduct, Canons 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 4.1\(A\)\(9\)](#). [In re Conduct of Pendleton, 870 N.W.2d 367 \(Minn. 2015\)](#).

Public reprimand and \$2,500 fine was appropriate sanction for county court judge who made appearances and filed motions as counsel more than six months after he assumed office as judge, even though Commission on Judicial Performance found no evidence that judge acted in bad faith; judge's actions violated Mississippi Canons of Judicial Conduct and statutes that prohibited county judges from practicing law in courts of county wherein they held court and that provided judges six months to bring to conclusion cases that were pending when they were appointed or elected. [Miss. Code Ann. §§ 9-1-25, 9-9-9](#); [Miss. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canons 1, 2\(A\), 2\(B\), 3\(A\), 4\(A\), 4\(G\)\(1\)](#). [Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Watts, 324 So. 3d 796 \(Miss. 2021\)](#).

Public reprimand, suspension from office without pay for 30 days, fine in amount of \$1,100, and assessments of costs of disciplinary proceeding were warranted for judge who threatened to use gun on defendant and made disparaging remarks to defendant's mother, demeaned her parenting skills, and made other demeaning comments and accusations. [Miss. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canons 1, 2\(A\), 3\(B\)\(4\), 3\(B\)\(5\)](#). [Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Vess, 227 So. 3d 952 \(Miss. 2017\)](#).

Public reprimand, suspension from the bench for 30 days without pay, a \$2,500 fine and \$5,882 in costs, and not removal from office, were appropriate sanctions for chancellor who improperly

signed ex parte orders resulting in dissipation of assets of a ward's estate, in violation of canons of judicial conduct; chancellor had not been investigated by Commission on Judicial Performance before, and he had not intended to commit harm to the ward. West's *A.M.C. Const. Art. 6, § 177A*; Code of Jud.Conduct, *Canon 1, 2, 3. Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Shoemake*, 191 So. 3d 1211 (Miss. 2016).

Removal from office was appropriate sanction for judge's misconduct in lending prestige of his office to advance private interests of friend, depriving drug-court participant of right to counsel of her choosing, keeping drug-court participants in program longer than statutorily allowed, improperly accepting participants into drug-program from other jurisdictions, and depriving drug-court participants of their due process rights, in violation of canons of judicial conduct, given judge's prior disciplinary history, judge's failure to take responsibility for his actions, the magnitude of the offenses and the harm suffered, the pattern of misconduct, and the knowing, deliberate, and deceptive nature of judge's actions. *U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14*; Code of Jud.Conduct, *Canon 1, 2(A, B), 3(B)(2, 4, 8), 3(C)(1). Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Thompson*, 169 So. 3d 857 (Miss. 2015).

Judge's admitted misconduct in deliberately and unlawfully incarcerating eleven citizens without affording them due process warranted her removal from office with payment of fine in the amount of \$1,000 and costs in the amount of \$200. *U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14*; Code of Jud.Conduct, *Canon 3(B)(4). Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Darby*, 143 So. 3d 564 (Miss. 2014).

Suspension of judge for a period of six months without pay was warranted, where judge engaged in a practice of deliberately postponing the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants in probation violation cases until after the time period for disqualification of the judge had passed, for the stated and overt reason of preventing the public defender from disqualifying her, in violation of the code of judicial conduct. *Mo. Const. art. 5, § 24*; Code of Judicial Conduct, rules 2-1.1, 2-1.2, 2-2.2(A,B), 2-2.3(A), 2-2.5(A), 2-2.6(A), 2-2.16. *In re Mennemeyer*, 505 S.W.3d 282 (Mo. 2017).

Judges making unpopular, difficult decisions is not a basis for discipline. *Matter of Russo*, 242 N.J. 179, 231 A.3d 563 (2020).

Public reprimand was appropriate sanction for district judge's violation of several canons of Code of Judicial Conduct, which amounted to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice bringing the judicial office into disrepute, in connection with her repeated and regular disparaging comments about Chief Judge to other judges, judicial staff, clerical staff, and members of local Bar; judge cooperated with Judicial Standards Commission throughout proceedings, expressed remorse, and was willing to seek assistance to improve her professional reputation and repair her relationship with Chief Judge. *N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7A-376*; Code of Jud.Conduct, *Canons 1, 2(A), 3(A)(3), (B)(1). In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge*, No. 17-143, 827 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. 2019).

Six month suspension from the practice of law, stayed on certain conditions, was warranted, in judicial disciplinary case, where judge, who had no prior disciplinary history, interfered with a case that had been assigned to another judge involving the incarcerated boyfriend of the daughter of judge's friends, engaged in ex parte communications with boyfriend, and orchestrated boyfriend's release on a recognizance bond two days before his scheduled arraignment, in violation of the judicial conduct rules, and judge exhibited an attitude of denial. Ohio Code of Jud. Conduct, Rules 1.2, 1.3, 2.9(A); [Ohio Gov. Bar R. 5\(13\)\(B, C\)](#). [Disciplinary Counsel v. Goulding](#), 162 Ohio St. 3d 482, 2020-Ohio-4588, 165 N.E.3d 1244 (2020).

Supreme Court approaches judicial discipline cases aware of the presumption of innocence attending criminal charges and mindful of the obligation that Court's supervisory intervention be fair to the jurist; nevertheless, in appropriate cases, any private interest of the jurist in continuing to preside over cases, and, furthermore, to receive compensation if suspended, may have to yield to the public interest of protecting the fairness and probity of the judicial process, and the integrity, dignity, and authority of the Unified Judicial System. [In re Bruno](#), 101 A.3d 635 (Pa. 2014).

Immediate and indefinite suspension, together with public reprimand and prohibition on ever holding judicial office in the state, was appropriate sanction for assistant judge's violation of multiple judicial canons in connection with his improper conduct regarding assets of estate of his uncle's wife; assistant judge's violations had continued throughout his tenure as assistant judge, judge refused to take responsibility for his actions, and judge had provided demonstrably false testimony on more than one occasion at disciplinary hearing. Vt. Code Jud. Conduct, [Canons 1, 2A, 4A\(2\), 5B\(2\)](#). [In re Kane](#), 2017 VT 48, 169 A.3d 180 (Vt. 2017).

Censure of family court judge, and not admonishment, together with fine of \$1,000, was appropriate sanction for judge's numerous violations of Rules of Code of Judicial Conduct arising out of judge's entry into and search of former husband's home, which was function of executive, not judiciary, to locate items of wife's personal property that husband had not turned over to wife under threat of holding husband in contempt of court if he refused to allow judge's entry, in course of hearing on wife's motion to hold husband in contempt; misconduct related directly to administration of justice, it was carried out in her public persona and seriously undermined public's perception of administration of justice, and judge displayed callous disregard for state's system of justice by failing to make recording of what transpired at father's home and even threatened arrest for those who did so, which made judge potential witness, and by refusing to undertake lawful procedures for preserving wife's personal property because she deemed them ineffective. W.Va. Judicial Disciplinary Proc. Rule 4.12. [Matter of Goldston](#), 866 S.E.2d 126 (W. Va. 2021).

Five-day suspension, rather than public reprimand, was warranted for circuit court judge's ex parte communication with prosecutor on merits of criminal case and for violation of duty of neutrality

by conducting independent internet investigation and failure to give criminal defendant a chance to respond to judge's misinformed allegations based on that investigation, despite mitigating circumstances of long history of community involvement, lack of prior ethics complaints, and lack of motive to satisfy personal desires or receive any personal benefit; judge's initial denials and later defenses suggested failure to fully appreciate seriousness of misconduct and impact on judicial system. [Wis. Stat. Ann. § 757.81\(4\)\(a\)](#); [Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 60.02, 60.03\(1\), 60.04\(1\)\(g\), \(1\)\(e\), \(4\)](#). [Disciplinary Proceedings Against Piontek, 2019 WI 51, 927 N.W.2d 552 \(Wis. 2019\)](#).

Disciplining municipal court judge and part-time circuit court magistrate who refused to perform same-sex marriages served compelling state interest of maintaining public confidence in judiciary by enforcing judiciary rules requiring independence and impartiality, as required under strict scrutiny analysis on judge's petition seeking rejection of recommendation by Commission on Judicial Conduct and Ethics that she be removed from her positions for violating First Amendment's free exercise clause; rather than simply express her views on matter of law or religion, judge stated her position that she would not perform judicial functions with impartiality, as she would not treat homosexual persons the same as she treated heterosexual persons. [U.S. Const. Amend. 1](#); [Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 20](#); [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-212\(a\)\(iii\)](#); [Wyo. Code of Jud. Conduct, Rules 1.2, 2.2, 2.3](#). [In re Neely, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728 \(Wyo. 2017\)](#).

[END OF SUPPLEMENT]

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Footnotes

- 1 [Cal.—Spruance v. Commission On Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841, 532 P.2d 1209 \(1975\)](#).
- 2 [Cal.—Haworth v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 4th 372, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853, 235 P.3d 152 \(2010\)](#), as modified, (Sept. 1, 2010).
[La.—In re Williams, 85 So. 3d 5 \(La. 2012\)](#).
[Mich.—In re Adams, 494 Mich. 162, 833 N.W.2d 897 \(2013\)](#), cert. denied, 2013 WL 5775151 (U.S. 2013).
[Minn.—In re Conduct of Karasov, 805 N.W.2d 255 \(Minn. 2011\)](#).
[Pa.—In re Merlo, 58 A.3d 1 \(Pa. 2012\)](#).
Other statements
(1) The appropriate sanction for judicial misconduct should recognize the misconduct, deter and discourage similar behavior, preserve the dignity and reputation of the judiciary, and protect the public.
[Miss.—Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. McGee, 71 So. 3d 578 \(Miss. 2011\)](#).

(2) The discipline imposed on a judge must be designed to announce publicly the supreme court's recognition that there has been misconduct.

Neb.—*In re Florom*, 280 Neb. 192, 784 N.W.2d 897 (2010).

3 Pa.—*In re Merlo*, 58 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).

W. Va.—*In re Fouty*, 229 W. Va. 256, 728 S.E.2d 140 (2012).

Sanction tailored to offense

Fundamentally, in a judicial misconduct proceeding, the sanction ought to fit the offense, and there should be a principled consistency with other like cases.

Miss.—*Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Darby*, 75 So. 3d 1037 (Miss. 2011).

4 Fla.—*In re Dekle*, 308 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1975).

Neb.—*In re Florom*, 280 Neb. 192, 784 N.W.2d 897 (2010).

5 Alaska—*In re Cummings*, 292 P.3d 187 (Alaska 2013).

Ark.—*Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Com'n v. Proctor*, 2010 Ark. 38, 360 S.W.3d 61 (2010).

Fla.—*In re Turner*, 76 So. 3d 898 (Fla. 2011).

Ga.—*Inquiry Concerning Fowler*, 287 Ga. 467, 696 S.E.2d 644 (2010).

Mich.—*In re Adams*, 494 Mich. 162, 833 N.W.2d 897 (2013), cert. denied, 2013 WL 5775151 (U.S. 2013).

Neb.—*In re Florom*, 280 Neb. 192, 784 N.W.2d 897 (2010).

N.C.—*In re Belk*, 364 N.C. 114, 691 S.E.2d 685 (2010).

Pa.—*In re Lokuta*, 608 Pa. 223, 11 A.3d 427 (2011).

S.D.—*In re Fuller*, 2011 SD 22, 798 N.W.2d 408 (S.D. 2011).

6 N.Y.—*In re Hedges*, 20 N.Y.3d 677, 965 N.Y.S.2d 773, 988 N.E.2d 509 (2013).

7 Ind.—*In re Harkin*, 958 N.E.2d 788 (Ind. 2011).

La.—*In re Boothe*, 110 So. 3d 1002 (La. 2013).

Minn.—*Inquiry into Conduct of Blakely*, 772 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. 2009).

Miss.—*Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Bradford*, 18 So. 3d 251 (Miss. 2009).

N.C.—*In re Hartsfield*, 365 N.C. 418, 722 S.E.2d 496 (2012).

Ohio—*Disciplinary Counsel v. Gaul*, 127 Ohio St. 3d 16, 2010-Ohio-4831, 936 N.E.2d 28 (2010).

Pa.—*In re Lowry*, 78 A.3d 1276 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 2013).

Tenn.—*In re Bell*, 344 S.W.3d 304 (Tenn. 2011).

8 Ark.—*Judicial Discipline and Disability Com'n v. Simes*, 2009 Ark. 543, 354 S.W.3d 72 (2009).

Minn.—*In re Conduct of Karasov*, 805 N.W.2d 255 (Minn. 2011).

Neb.—*In re Marcuzzo*, 278 Neb. 331, 770 N.W.2d 591 (2009).

N.M.—*In re Salazar*, 2013-NMSC-007, 299 P.3d 409 (N.M. 2013).

Forfeiture of salary and pension

Pa.—*Berkhimer v. State Employees' Retirement Bd.*, 60 A.3d 873 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).

9 N.D.—*In re Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman*, 1999 ND 122, 595 N.W.2d 592 (N.D. 1999).

Ohio—*Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum*, 133 Ohio St. 3d 500, 2012-Ohio-4700, 979 N.E.2d 289 (2012).

10 La.—*In re Sanborn*, 50 So. 3d 1279 (La. 2010).

Miss.—*Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Perdue*, 853 So. 2d 85 (Miss. 2003).

Tex.—*In re Canales*, 113 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. Review Trib. 2003), order withdrawn, (Sept. 24, 2004) and aff'd, (Sept. 24, 2004).

Va.—*Judicial Inquiry and Review Com'n of Virginia v. Waymack*, 284 Va. 527, 745 S.E.2d 410 (2012).

Power of removal implicitly permitting lesser sanction

Del.—*Matter of Buckson*, 610 A.2d 203 (Del. Jud. Ct. 1992).

11 Ind.—*Matter of Drury*, 602 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. 1992).

12 U.S.—*In re Judicial Misconduct*, 664 F.3d 332 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2011).

Cal.—*Haworth v. Superior Court*, 50 Cal. 4th 372, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853, 235 P.3d 152 (2010), as modified, (Sept. 1, 2010).

Del.—*In re Coppadge*, 74 A.3d 593 (Del. 2013).

Fla.—*In re Singbush*, 93 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 2012).

Iowa—*In re Block*, 816 N.W.2d 362 (Iowa 2012).

La.—*In re Burgess*, 85 So. 3d 604 (La. 2012).

Miss.—*Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Dearman*, 73 So. 3d 1140 (Miss. 2011).

N.J.—*In re Perskie*, 207 N.J. 275, 24 A.3d 277 (2011).

N.C.—*In re Totten*, 365 N.C. 458, 722 S.E.2d 783 (2012).

Or.—*In re Barnack*, 353 Or. 205, 299 P.3d 525 (2013).

S.C.—*In re Bryngelson*, 403 S.C. 115, 742 S.E.2d 392 (2013).

Vt.—*In re Hodgdon*, 189 Vt. 265, 2011 VT 19, 19 A.3d 598 (2011).

13 Miss.—*Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Bowen*, 123 So. 3d 381 (Miss. 2013).

Ohio—*In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Carr*, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 81, 658 N.E.2d 1158 (Comm'n of Judges 1995), order aff'd, 76 Ohio St. 3d 320, 1996-Ohio-396, 667 N.E.2d 956 (1996).

14 Ind.—*Matter of Drury*, 602 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. 1992).

15 Ind.—*Matter of Drury*, 602 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. 1992).

Miss.—Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Fowlkes, 121 So. 3d 904 (Miss. 2013).

N.M.—In re Schwartz, 2011-NMSC-019, 149 N.M. 721, 255 P.3d 299 (2011).

Ohio—In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Moll, 135 Ohio St. 3d 156, 2012-Ohio-5674, 985 N.E.2d 436 (2012).

Utah—In re Christensen, 2013 UT 30, 304 P.3d 835 (Utah 2013).

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S.C.—In re Evans, 376 S.C. 540, 658 S.E.2d 78 (2008); In re Koulpasis, 376 S.C. 496, 657 S.E.2d 759 (2008).

Public reprimand warranted

S.C.—Denmark Mun. Court Judge Myron V. Anderson, 380 S.C. 70, 668 S.E.2d 413 (2008).

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Ark.—Proctor v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 206, 392 S.W.3d 360 (2010).

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Ark.—Proctor v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 206, 392 S.W.3d 360 (2010).

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Ark.—Proctor v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 206, 392 S.W.3d 360 (2010).

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Ind.—In re Harkin, 958 N.E.2d 788 (Ind. 2011).

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